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ABSTRACT
Using panel data and case studies, we analyze the pre-1970 history of international capital flows and
current account reversals. Considering a sample of emerging markets and advanced economies with
per capita GDPs at least 60 per cent those of the lead country, we show that the incidence of
reversals has been unusually great in recent years. The only prior period that matched the last three
decades in terms of the frequency and magnitude of reversals was the 1920s and 1930s, decades
notorious for the instability of capital flows. In contrast, reversals were both less common and
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1.  Introduction 
  Sharp reductions in current account deficits can be disruptive.  Milessi-Ferretti 
and Razin (2000) in their seminal study of the phenomenon, known as “current account 
reversals,” emphasize the dangers of large current account deficits that must be 
compressed when external financing dries up.  Their study, written in the aftermath of the 
Asian crisis, presumably had countries like Thailand in mind.  The authors cite other 
disruptive reversals, such as Uruguay’s at the beginning of the Latin American debt 
crisis, when financing for the current account deficit collapsed and growth fell from +5 
per cent to -7 per cent.
2  Looking forward there is the question of what would happen to 
growth in the United States if financing for the country’s 5 per cent plus current account 
deficit evaporated abruptly.  Will the dollar fall, fanning import price inflation and 
forcing the Fed to raise interest rates?  How would the housing and stock markets react?  
Sharp reductions in consumption and investment might have to be brought about by this 
rise in interest rates and fall in asset valuations, since the current account is the difference 
between investment and saving.   
  But not all current account reversals are disruptive.  In Milesi-Ferretti and Razin’s 
own sample, the median change in growth between the periods before and after such 
reversals is zero.  The output response, in other words, is very heterogeneous.  For every 
                                                 
1 Prepared for the NBER Conference on G7 Current Account Imbalances, Newport, Rhode Island, June 1-
2, 2005.  We thank Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti and Alan Taylor for assistance with data and participants in 
the preconference, especially Rick Mishkin, for helpful comments. 
2 Between 1979-81 and 1982-84.   2 
Uruguay there is a Nigeria, where growth went from -5.5 per cent in 1981-83 to +3 per 
cent in 1984-86 despite sharp compression of the current account. 
From an analytical standpoint, this is not surprising.  Deficits develop for different 
reasons.  A deficit reflecting a temporary surge in investment owing to unusually rapid 
productivity growth and high profitability will have different implications than a deficit 
reflecting a temporary surge in consumption produced by the growth of public 
consumption or overvaluation of the currency.  Equally, current account deficits can be 
eliminated for number of very different reasons, which are likely to have very different 
output effects. 
  Nor is it clear that current account reversals were always as disruptive as in recent 
years.  The obvious contrast is the period before World War I, when very large deficits 
were allowed to develop and persist.  Bayoumi (1989) considers average current account 
deficits over periods as long as 1870-1913 and finds that these reached high levels in 
countries like Australia and Canada.  Taylor (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) do 
the same over successive decades starting in the late 19
th century and show that current 
account balances were larger in that period than anytime in the 20
th century.   To be sure, 
some of these deficits were compressed abruptly with interruptions to the flow of external 
finance, reflecting a combination of rising interest rates in the capital-exporting countries 
and economic and political problems in the capital importers.  Instances springing to 
mind where current account deficits fell sharply and precipitated banking or currency 
crises include Denmark in 1885-6, Argentina in 1889-90, Canada in 1890-91, Australia in 
1891-2, Brazil in 1896-7, Japan in 1899-1900, and Finland in 1900-1.
3  Although crises 
                                                 
3 These are all years of or adjoining banking and currency crises as independently dated by Bordo and 
Eichengreen (2003).    3 
can occur for reasons other than those associated with current account reversals, the 
connections between the two phenomena are clear.  Recall Fischer’s (1988) caution that 
the “primary indicator [of a looming crisis] is the current account deficit.”
4   
  At the same time, crises – currency crises in particular – were lower in frequency 
under the gold standard than in recent years.
5  Indeed, another reading of gold standard 
experience is that the economic and political environment made current account reversals 
less of a problem.  Greater wage and price flexibility in an era of unstructured labor 
markets facilitated the adjustment of relative prices when the current account balance had 
to be compressed abruptly (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1996).  With government budgets 
close to balance in peacetime, the twin deficits problem that gives rise to “bad current 
account deficits,” financing for which dries up suddenly when concerns arise about the 
sustainability of public debts, was less prevalent.  Because large current account deficits 
reflected unusually high levels of investment in export-supporting infrastructure, those 
deficits could be smoothly reduced by increased savings out of progressively higher 
domestic incomes and increases in exports of goods and services (Feis 1930, Fishlow 
1986).
6  Since the credibility of the commitment to exchange rate stability was beyond 
reproach, events that might have interrupted capital inflows and forced disruptive 
compression of the current account elicited capital inflows that allowed that deficit to be 
wound down smoothly rather than precipitating a crisis.  Some of these tales are 
consistent with fewer or smaller current account reversals, while others are consistent 
                                                 
4 Also cited in Edwards (2004b). 
5 This is the finding of Bordo and Eichengreen (2003). 
6 We can think of this as a somewhat refined version of the Lawson Doctrine as applied to the gold 
standard.   4 
with smaller output losses (smoother adjustment to equally frequent or large current 
account shocks). 
These observations suggest a series of questions.  Were current account reversals 
less frequent under the gold standard?  Were their growth effects less disruptive?  And if 
there are differences across epochs, what is their explanation? 
  Bracketed by the gold standard and the post-1970 float were the 1920s and 1930s, 
when capital flow volatility, economic instability, and financial crises were pervasive, 
and the Bretton Woods quarter century, when capital flows were limited, recessions were 
rare, and banking crises were essentially nonexistent.  Given the contingent nature of the 
connection between economic volatility on the one hand and current account reversals on 
the other, it would be illuminating to know whether reversals were larger, more frequent, 
and more disruptive in the interwar period – and smaller, less common, and less 
disruptive under Bretton Woods. 
  In what follows we take a first cut at measuring the frequency, magnitude and 
effects of current account reversals in the gold standard era (1880-1914), the interwar 
period (1919-39), Bretton Woods (1945-70), and the post-Bretton Woods float (1972-
1997).   We use regression analysis to see how far we can get in ascribing cross-period 
differences to observable characteristics of countries and the international economic 
environment.   
  The results confirm that the gold standard era and the years since 1970 differed 
strikingly from one another: reversals were smaller and less frequent in the gold standard 
period.  Controlling for, inter alia, the size of the initial current account imbalance, the 
movement in the real exchange rate and the state of the global economy does not make   5 
this difference go away.  Evidently, there was something else about the gold standard 
years that rendered current accounts more stable.  But when reversals did take place, their 
effects were every bit as disruptive as after 1945.  This prompts us to consider a set of 
case studies in an effort to shed more light on the issue. 
The intervening period from the 1920s through the 1960s is more difficult to 
characterize.  The two interwar decades emerge here, as elsewhere, as years of instability: 
reversals were frequent and large and had major output costs.  Under Bretton Woods, in 
contrast, reversals were few and small; in both respects this period resembles the gold 
standard years.  These facts are presumably explicable in part by the prevalence of capital 
controls and tight regulation of domestic financial markets.   
Finally, the years since 1972 are grouped with the gold standard years in terms of 
ease of adjustment to reversals.  The output losses from current account reversals appear 
to be significantly smaller not just compared to the interwar years (which is not 
surprising) but also compared to Bretton Woods.  In the conclusion we speculate about 
what changes in markets and institutions might help to account for this fact. 
 
2.  The Country Sample 
     Our empirical analysis utilizes data from Bordo and Eichengreen (2003) extended 
to incorporate additional variables and countries.
7  The principal sources are compendia 
and monographs containing national historical statistics for the period prior to 1913, 
publications of the League of Nations for the interwar period, and standard World Bank 
                                                 
7 For a more extensive discussion of data sources see that publication.   6 
and International Monetary Fund sources after World War II.  The resulting data set has 
been checked and adjusted for compatibility.
8 
    A problem for any study that undertakes historical comparisons over long periods 
is the country sample.  Reasonably complete macroeconomic statistics including not only 
GDP and trade but also financial variables are available back to the late 19
th century only 
for a subset of Western European countries, overseas regions of recent European 
settlement (the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), and a few of the 
larger Latin American countries (Argentina and Brazil).  The question is whether to 
follow this same group of countries over time (as in for example Taylor 1996 and 
Obstfeld and Taylor 2004) or to add additional countries as more data become available 
(as in inter alia Bayoumi 1989).   
     Both approaches have drawbacks.  Following the same 10 to 15 European 
countries and offshoots over the entire 120 years maximizes the comparability of the 
country sample at the cost of representativeness.  If we are interested in the determinants 
and consequences of current account reversals in modern-day emerging markets and how 
                                                 
8 Several limitations of these data are worth noting.  The current account estimates for the period before 
1945 build on reported figures for imports and exports of goods and services, following inter alia Bayoumi 
(1990), Taylor (1996), and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).  This leaves open the possibility that some service 
items are under- or unreported (imports and exports of shipping, insurance and financial services, for 
example).  In addition, there is the possibility of spurious volatility in earlier (specifically, pre-1914) output 
data (Romer 1986).  To the extent that this bias exists, it will presumably exaggerate the difference between 
growth rates during expansions and contractions and therefore the magnitude of the output effects of 
current account reversals.  Finally, some variables that have proven popular in recent analyses of the causes 
and consequences of current account reversals (measures of the composition of the public debt, for 
instance) are not readily available for this earlier period and are therefore excluded from the analysis.  In 
particular, information on the capital account, as distinct from the current account, is not readily available 
for earlier periods.  (For an idea of what kind of distinct data on international capital flows exist for the 
period prior to 1913, see Bloomfield 1963, 1968 and Stone 1999.)  Data on reserves and imports and 
exports of goods and services capture capital flows imperfectly to the extent that they do not measure trade 
in certain services – see above – and to the extent that information on foreign exchange reserves is 
incomplete.  The analysis here follows Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000) – hereinafter MFR – who similarly 
focus on the current account reversals but do not look separately at sudden stops in capital flows, unlike 
Edwards (2004a, b) who looks at both.   7 
these compare with such reversals in their historical antecedents, then a sample that 
includes at most a couple of modern-day emerging markets is not likely to be 
representative of their experience.  If, on the other hand, one freely adds more countries 
as data on these become available, then one ends up with better representation of modern 
emerging markets but also with problems of intertemporal comparability.  At the 
beginning of the period the sample will be mainly comprised of a small number of 
relatively advanced industrial economies, while at the end of the period it will be 
dominated by a large number of low income countries, where the causes, consequences, 
and incidence of current account reversals may be significantly different.  Assume, for 
example, that current account reversals are more frequent in low-income countries.  
Adding more low-income countries as data on them become available over time will then 
bias the analysis toward the conclusion that reversals have been growing more frequent 
purely as a result of sample composition. 
  We therefore take a third approach to sample selection.  Our strategy is to define a 
consistent criterion in terms of relative per capita income – that is, a threshold value of 
per capita income relative to the highest-income country in the first period, 1880-1913 – 
and to add additional countries as data on them become available only if they satisfy this 
criterion.
9  We calculate for the period 1880-1914 the ratio of per capita income in the 
lowest income country in the sample for that period (Brazil) to the highest income 
country (the United States), which turns out to be 0.6.  As data for more countries 
become available, we then add all countries whose per capita incomes are at least 60 per 
cent of the per capita incomes of the lead country.   In 1919-39, for example, the lead 
                                                 
9 Observations for very low income economies are also limited toward the beginning of the sample period 
because many such economies were not then independent countries.   8 
country is again the United States, so we add all countries whose per capita incomes are 
at least 60 per cent of U.S. levels for which we have comprehensive data.  We do the 
same for the Bretton Woods period and again once more for the post-Bretton Woods 
years.   
   The resulting country sample is shown in Appendix Table A1.  One can see how 
sample size increases over time, while sample composition is not unduly dominated by 
low-income countries which are necessarily omitted at the beginning of our long 
historical period.  Thus, our analysis of current account reversals should be thought of as 
characterizing their incidence and consequences in middle- and high-income countries 
(also referred to in the literature as “emerging” and “advanced” markets) but not also in 
the poorest countries.  Insofar as the economic volatility tends to be higher and 
dependence on capital flows is less in the poorest countries, separate analysis of such 
countries would seem appropriate.  In some of the analysis that follows we compare what 
we find using this limited sample for the post-1970 period with results obtained using the 
somewhat larger country sample employed by Milesi Ferretti and Razin as a way of 
gauging the consequences of our sampling strategy. 
 
3.  A Brief History of Current Accounts 
We set the stage for the analysis that follows by first summarizing the historical 
behavior of current accounts.   
Two traditional ways of doing so are calculating the mean absolute value of the 
current account over some period of time (say, five years) and running Feldstein-Horioka 
(1980) regressions of the two components of the current account (investment and   9 
savings) on one another.  Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) have done this for 15 countries 
similar to our pre-1914 sample.  They report that the average absolute value of the current 
account balance as a share of GDP was between 3 and 4 per cent prior to 1914.  The 
(absolute) current account remains at a relatively high 3.9 per cent in the immediate post-
World War I years 1919-1926, reflecting the exceptional investment demands associated 
with postwar reconstruction (the largest value is for France), but then falls to 2.7 in 1927-
31 and 1.5 in 1932-39, as capital controls are imposed and international financial markets 
shut down.  The average absolute value of current accounts was small in the Bretton 
Woods years, when capital flows were still heavily controlled (1.8 per cent of GDP in 
1947-59 and 1.3 per cent in 1960-73), before rising in 1974-89 and 1989-2000 (to 2.2 per 
cent and 2.3 per cent, respectively), higher than under Bretton Woods but not the same 
levels witnessed before 1914.
10   
Obstfeld and Taylor also run a succession of cross section regressions using five-
year averaged data of investment on savings and a constant term.  The results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that capital mobility and hence the average magnitude of 
current account balances traces out a u-shaped pattern over time.  The “savings-retention 
coefficient” (the estimated effect of savings on investment) is 0.5 until 1914, 0.6-0.7 in 
the 1920s, 0.8-0.9 in the 1930s, 0.9 in the Bretton Woods years, and 0.7-0.8 in the post-
Bretton Woods sample.  Like the summary statistics in the previous paragraph, this 
regression analysis suggests that while capital mobility is higher today than in the third 
quarter of the 20
th century, it has yet to rescale the peak reached before 1914.
11   
                                                 
10 Obstfeld and Taylor also look at wartime current account balances, which we do not consider here. 
11 Or even to match the levels reached in the 1920s.   10 
     While these results provide a summary measure of ex post capital mobility in a 
constant sample of countries, it is not clear that they adequately summarize capital 
mobility in the world as a whole, since the number of independent countries – and the 
number of middle- as well as high-income countries potentially connected to 
international capital markets in particular  – is changing over our 12 decades.  Bear in 
mind, as emphasized above, that we are concerned with middle- and high-income 
countries and systematically omit from our sample low-income countries that are 
plausibly less connected to international capital markets (and for which data are scarce).  
To the extent that our country sample corrects for this, we may paint a somewhat 
different picture.  A further problem with these estimates is that for almost all of these 
cross section estimates of the savings-retention coefficient the confidence levels 
overlap.
12  While the tendency for this coefficient to be larger toward the middle of the 
sample period suggests a u-shaped time profile for capital mobility (high toward the 
beginning and end of the period), it is not clear whether the intertemporal differences are 
significant – and thus whether the null of a random fluctuations around the average can 
be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of a u-shaped time profile of capital 
mobility.   
We may be able to do better insofar as our criterion for selecting countries allows 
the sample to expand over time, while still applying consistent conditions for an 
observation’s inclusion in the sample.  The first column of Table 1 shows the mean 
absolute value of current accounts for various subperiods for our sample; column 2 is the 
comparison with Obstfeld and Taylor.  We still observe a u-shaped pattern, with the 
magnitude of current account balances dipping down in 1927-31 and 1932-39.  Our 
                                                 
12 In part, this is presumably a function of the small samples of 12 countries for each point in time.   11 
numbers are essentially the same as Obstfeld and Taylor’s through 1939 but larger for the 
recent period.  Taken literally, this suggests, contrary to Obstfeld and Taylor, that 
international capital markets are more integrated than before 1913, not less.
13  The 
difference reflects our sampling strategy and our addition of more relatively small 
countries with relatively large current account balances, especially in the last subperiod.  
Figure 1 provides visual confirmation of these patterns.  It is also a reminder, however, 
that confidence intervals are wide, so that not too much should be made of these 
differences.   
Table 2 is another reminder of this fact. Using a different periodization, it reports 
estimates of the associated savings-retention coefficients.  The savings-retention 
coefficients are 0.58 for the prewar period, 0.88 for interwar period, 0.86 for the Bretton 
Woods period, and 0.73 for the post-1971 sample.   This methodology and periodization 
thus suggests that capital mobility was slightly higher before 1914, although the contrast 
here is more muted than in some previous results (see e.g. Bayoumi 1989). 
  Thus, our new sample, intended to facilitate summary characterizations of 
differences in the extent of global capital mobility over time rather than simply following 
an unchanging country sample, broadly confirms the standard historical interpretation but 
also provides some new nuances.   
 
4.  From Current Accounts to Current Account Reversals 
     We now move from current account balances to current account reversals, defined 
as episodes in which the current account strengthens sharply, generally moving from 
                                                 
13 That capital markets are more integrated today than before 1914 is also the conclusion of Bordo, 
Eichengreen and Irwin (1999), who use an entirely different approach.   12 
deficit to surplus, in three or fewer years.  It is useful at this point to reiterate what was 
said in the introduction about why we focus on these episodes.  Current account balances 
have a number of positive functions that appear in textbooks under the heading of “the 
intertemporal approach to the current account” (see for example Obstfeld and Rogoff 
1996).  If the current account strengthens when output is high and weakens when it is 
low, its fluctuation is indicative of a country’s ability to smooth its consumption.  An 
ongoing current account deficit in a rapidly growing country may also be an indication 
that investment and growth are not unduly constrained by domestic savings capacity, 
facilitating the country’s convergence to steady state levels of output and capital 
intensity.  In practice, however, these advantages may be neutralized or dominated if 
large or persistent current account deficits increase the likelihood of disruptive 
adjustments that produce large output losses.
14  Everyone can recall episodes when large 
current account deficits ended in the sudden curtailment of financing, sharp compression 
of the current account, and a drop in economic growth.  Yet, as we have also noted, post-
1970 experience suggests that not all current account reversals end this way.  And it is 
not obvious a priori that large current account deficits bore the same association with 
instability in earlier periods, such as the pre-1914 gold standard years.   
     Thus, we wish to determine whether current account reversals were always a 
problem – whether they have always been frequent and disruptive.  If current account 
reversals were not always a problem, then it will be important to establish why.  
Hopefully the answer will point to policy measures that can be taken at the national or 
                                                 
14 This is the warning in the quote from Fischer above to the effect that large current account deficits are 
leading indicators of impending problems.  His intuition that large current account deficits are leading 
indicators of currency and banking crises gains further support from the literature on early warning systems 
for emerging markets (Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000).   13 
international levels to tilt the costs and benefits of international capital mobility in 
socially desirable directions. 
     To identify current account reversals we use the same criteria as MFR.   We 
construct two variants of their measure, denoted Rev1and Rev2.  Rev1 (and Rev2) must 
satisfy three criteria: the average current account deficit must fall by 2 (3) per cent of 
GDP between the first three and second three years; the maximum deficit in second three 
years must be no larger than minimum deficit in first three years; and the average deficit 
must fall by at least a third (as a percentage of GDP) between the first three and second 
three years.  Obviously, the 2 per cent cutoff generates more reversals than the 3 per cent 
cutoff. 
A list of the individual reversals for the pre-1970 period, excluding reversals 
occurring in consecutive years and reversals occurring in wartime, appears as Appendix 
Table A2.  
 
5.  Statistical Findings 
     Table 3 summarizes the frequency of reversals under the gold standard, the 
interwar period, Bretton Woods, and the post-Bretton Woods years.  Rev1 (based on two 
per cent reductions in the current account deficit relative to the three preceding years) 
shows that a lower frequency of reversals under the gold standard than under any of the 
subsequent regimes.  There are 59 reversal episodes (11 per cent of the period sample of 
years) in 1880-1914, 102 episodes (27 per cent of the sample) in 1918-1939, 62 episodes 
(12 per cent of the sample) in 1945-72, and 361 episodes (26 per cent of the sample) in 
1972-1997.  So measured, reversals were relatively infrequent under the gold standard   14 
and Bretton Woods but much more frequent during the interwar period and since the 
collapse of Bretton Woods.  If one excludes reversals occurring in consecutive years, 
their number falls to 30, 35, 28 and 101, but the ranking of frequencies (6, 10, 5 and 10 
per cent) remains basically unchanged, the main difference being that the Bretton Woods 
period looks slightly better than the gold standard years.  From the perspective of the 
historical literature, these contrasts are not surprising; the interwar years and recent 
decades are both periods when there was much commentary about capital flow volatility, 
unusually severe recessions and financial crises, all of which may be correlates of current 
account reversals. 
To be sure, simple tabulations do not tell us why reversals were more frequent in 
some periods than others.  Candidate explanations include, inter alia, volatile policies, 
volatile financial markets, and a volatile global economic environment.  We will consider 
these possibilities more directly below.  
   Figure 3 shows the number of reversals by year.  In the first panel of Figure 3 for 
the gold standard, the largest cluster is in the first half of the 1890s following the Baring-
Argentina crisis and the collapse of international lending.  In the interwar period, 
reversals are spread fairly evenly over the immediate postwar years, the 1920s, and the 
early 1930s, reflecting macroeconomic turbulence, shocks to international financial 
markets (associated with failed stabilization efforts, reparations disputes and so forth), the 
rise in U.S. interest rates in 1928 (which led to the sharp curtailment of foreign lending) 
and then onset of the Great Depression and widespread debt default starting in 1931.  
Reversals are relatively few in the mid-to-late 1930s, reflecting the widespread adoption 
of trade and capital controls through which countries balanced their current accounts and   15 
limited their dependence on capital flows.  Under Bretton Woods, reversals are 
concentrated in the first postwar quinquennium and centered in Europe.  This was the 
period when postwar foreign aid that had financed current account deficits was drawing 
to a close and foreign reserves had been run down, forcing countries to balance their trade 
accounts.   
     Next we calculated the magnitude of reversals in each period, measured as the 
change in the current account/GDP ratio between the three pre-reversal and three post-
reversal years. The magnitude of reversals so measured was 3.13 per cent of GDP under 
the gold standard, 6.43 in the interwar years, 3.51 under Bretton Woods, and 5.46 since 
the breakdown of that system.  Evidently, reversals were largest in the interwar years but 
only slightly smaller after 1970.  They were smallest under the gold standard, but only 
slightly smaller than under Bretton Woods when international capital flows and the 
magnitude of feasible current account balances were tightly constrained.  The special 
nature of gold standard experience compared to the two other periods of high capital 
mobility comes through clearly from this comparison.
15 
                                                 
15 As an alternative, we also scaled the change in the current account/GDP ratio by the initial current 
account balance (as a share of GDP, where initial is defined as the average over the three years preceding 
the event).  Since the magnitude of the scaling factor varied across periods, this can be thought of as a 
period-specific measure of the magnitude of reversals (one that controls for differences across periods in, 
inter alia, the extent of international capital mobility and therefore the size of current account deficits in the 
typical pre-reversal period).  The change in the current account/GDP ratio in (the three) subsequent years as 
a percentage of the initial (three year) current account ratio is 79 per cent, 210 per cent and 190 per cent 
and 112 per cent in our four chronologically successive periods.  The main difference here is that Bretton 
Woods appears as a period of relatively large reversals, so scaled.  Of course, the reason reversals appear so 
large under Bretton Woods when expressed as a percentage of the initial current account ratio is that those 
initial current account deficits were so small, reflecting the prevalence of controls on capital inflows and 
the demoralized state of international financial markets.  Indeed, there are no very large current account 
deficits in the Bretton Woods years comparable to those evident in other periods, and the largest current 
account deficits in the Bretton Woods years tend to be concentrated in 1945-50, when there were still 
reserves and foreign aid to finance them (see above).  The unweighted average of the current account 
deficit in the three years preceding the reversal episodes is 3.8 under Bretton Woods, compared to 5.2 in the 
interwar period and 5.7 in the post-Bretton Woods years (and 4.9 under the gold standard).   16 
Table 4 shows summary statistics for GDP growth and the change in growth in 
the year of the reversal and windows ranging from one to four years following its 
occurrence.  Growth is slower in reversal than nonreversal years, and it generally remains 
depressed for one or two additional years before bouncing back.  Subsequently, growth in 
the reversal cases generally exceeds growth in the nonreversal cases, as output lost in the 
reversal episodes is made up.  The v-shaped output response to reversals has been noted 
previously; see for example Calvo (2005).  
Gauged in terms of the difference in growth rates between reversal and 
nonreversal years, reversals were less costly – as well as smaller and less frequent – prior 
to 1914.  Growth was not significantly slower in reversal than nonreversal years before 
1914 (the difference in growth rates, of -0.02 per cent, is not significantly different from 
zero at standard confidence levels), 2.68 percentage points slower in the interwar years, 
and 3.75 percentage points slower in the Bretton Woods years (Rev1 definition).  It is 
tempting to interpret the growing output costs of reversals as reflecting a secular decline 
in wage, price and general economic flexibility over time (see e.g. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1996).  
However, the difference in growth rates between reversal and nonreversal years 
falls to 1.32 percentage points after 1972, though that difference is still statistically 
significant at the 99 per cent confidence level.  Note that this is a different intertemporal 
pattern than we found for the frequency of reversals and their magnitude, both of which 
were greater after 1972 than in the Bretton Woods years.  It also becomes hard to identify 
differences across regimes when we look at the longer-term impact of reversals (the   17 
change in output between the reversal year and the subsequent three years, or between the 
year following the reversal and the subsequent four years).
16 
     Table 5 reports probit regressions designed to shed light on the incidence of 
reversals.  All independent variables are lagged.  Following MFR, most of the 
explanatory variables are averaged over the first three years of the six year window in 
question to maintain consistency with the definition of reversals themselves.
17  Given our 
limited degrees of freedom and interest in intertemporal comparisons, we pool the data 
for the four periods and include period fixed effects.  Since certain countries are 
especially prone to reversals in certain periods, we use the cluster option in Stata to adjust 
for the fact that the error terms for a particular country in a particular period may not be 
independent of one another.
18  The regressions come in trios.  Within each trio, the first 
column reports robust standard errors.  The second clusters the observations by countries.  
The third then drops the observations for the UK, which we classify as the center country 
for part of the period, on the grounds that reversals in a country that either is or recently 
was the financial center are a qualitatively different phenomenon.
19 
     MFR found that reversals are more likely in countries with large current account 
deficits, real exchange rates suggesting growing overvaluation, large government deficits, 
low per capita incomes, low reserves, high interest rates at the center, high growth at the 
center, and high ratios of concessional to total debt.  They consider U.S. interest rates and 
OECD growth; for the period before 1914, we consider British interest rates and British 
                                                 
16 We return to this below. 
17 See the footnote to the relevant table for details. 
18 To be clear, we do not allow for clustering of the error terms for all reversals for, say, Argentina, but for 
all reversals for Argentina in a particular period, say, 1880-1913 or 1972-98. 
19 In contrast, we have no reversals for the United States except in the first period, when we take Britain 
and not the U.S. as the center country.   18 
growth, while for the interwar period we consider U.S. interest rates and U.S. growth.  
Like them, we find some evidence that reversals are more likely in countries with large 
current account deficits and large budget deficits, in countries with low per capita GDPs 
relative to the lead country (proxying, presumably, for relatively weak institutions and 
markets), and in periods when growth rates in the center country are high.  We also find 
that reversals are more likely in more open economies, where here openness may be 
proxying for economic size.  Edwards (2005), in another analysis of middle- and high-
income countries, similarly finds that reversals are more likely in relatively small, 
relatively open economies. 
     It is important to mention some of the variables that do not show up as consistently 
significant.  For example, some studies of recent decades have found that reversals are 
more likely when the exchange rate is pegged, presumably making it more difficult to 
adjust relative prices prior to the event (Edwards 2004b).  Here the coefficient estimates 
for whether or not the exchange rate is pegged display never approach statistical 
significance at standard confidence levels.
20  Similarly, the last three columns of the table 
add a dummy variable for capital controls.  There is some evidence that the maintenance 
of controls limits the incidence of reversals, although this variable again is not 
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels.
21 
                                                 
20 We replicated MFR’s result when we used our sample of countries but limited the observations to the 
post-1972 period, but not otherwise. 
21 We found essentially the same thing for the four subperiods estimated separately (in results not reported 
here), although significance levels vary.  For the gold standard period, large prior current account deficits, 
large prior budget deficits, and low GDP per capita are the most robust and statistically significant 
determinants of reversal incidence.  For the interwar period, reversals are more likely in countries with 
lower GDP per capita, large prior current account deficits and budget deficits and no capital controls. For 
the Bretton Woods period, countries with terms of trade improvement and large current account deficits are 
more likely to experience reversals. For the post 1970 sample, large prior current account deficit and 
having a peg are the main determinants of reversals.  We also ran our specification using the MFR sample 
of countries in the post-1970 period.  The main difference is that the GDP per capita changes sign such that   19 
    Another noteworthy feature of Table 5 is that the dummy variables for the gold 
standard and Bretton Woods periods are negative and significant (the post-1972 years are 
the omitted alternative).  Recall that we found above that reversals were less frequent 
under the gold standard and Bretton Woods than in the interwar and post-1972 periods.  
These coefficients are telling us that this difference is not fully explained by differences 
in observable country characteristics (the size of the initial imbalances, the fiscal stance, 
the global growth enrivonment etc.) but that it is at least partially explicable in terms of 
other factors that we are not capturing here.   
Table 6 turns to the consequences of current account reversals.  The dependent 
variable is growth over three years, starting with the year of the reversal, as a deviation 
from the world average for that same three-year period following the reversal onset.
22  
The explanatory variables include the size of the reversal and a vector of controls (except 
where indicated otherwise, averaged over the 3 years preceding the event).  Again, the 
data are pooled and estimated with period fixed effects.  The first two columns show 
ordinary least squares regressions with robust standard errors.  Columns 3 through 6 then 
cluster the observations by country within each period.   
The results suggest that reversals were relatively costly when a large current 
account deficit had been allowed to emerge and the real exchange rate was allowed to 
become significantly overvalued in the preceding period.  In addition, we consider a 
                                                                                                                                                 
countries with relatively high per capita incomes are more likely to experience reversals.  (Note that the 
MFR sample does not include the advanced-industrial countries, so this result is telling us – consistent with 
intuition – that within the sample of emerging markets the higher-income EMs more integrated into 
international capital markets are more subject to reversals). The main difference between these two pooled 
regressions is that the one using the MFR countries for the post-1970 period shows a positive sign on the 
interwar dummy (although one that varies in significance across specifications). 
22 It makes little difference if we instead define the dependent variable as the growth rate in the subject 
country over the three year period and include the global growth rate over the same period as another 
independent variable on the right hand side.  In this case the main difference is that the dummy variable for 
Bretton Woods becomes positive (although it remains insignificant).   20 
dummy variable for whether the current account was in deficit or surplus in the pre-
reversal period, since in some of our cases the event in question is one in which a small 
current account surplus becomes much larger, and it can be argued that in this case the 
output effects may be easier to accommodate.  The results are consistent with this 
hypothesis.  Finally, we added a dummy variable for the presence of controls on capital 
account transactions on the grounds that such controls may limit capital flight in the wake 
of the reversal, again moderating the output effects.  The results are consistent with this 
intuition: output losses are smaller when the current account is already in surplus in the 
pre-reversal period and capital controls are present.  But again the addition of these 
variables does not alter our earlier findings.  
An additional result is that a number of period dummies show up as statistically 
significant.  A negative (positive) sign means that growth was slower and output losses 
were larger (growth was faster and output losses were smaller) in the period in question: 
thus we find smaller output losses under the gold standard but larger output losses in the 
interwar and Bretton Woods periods than in the omitted post-1972 alternative after 
controlling for other observed characteristics of countries and the global environment 
(that is, after controlling for the values of the independent variables).  Recall that the 
simple tabulation of output losses in different periods showed the same thing.  That we 
see the same pattern here suggests that the other explanatory variables such as the size of 
the initial current account imbalance, the overvaluation of the real exchange rate or the 
presence or absence of capital controls do not explain why the typical output loss from 
reversals was smaller in some periods than in others.   21 
  This result sits uneasily with the cases in Section 6 below, which show that the 
output effects of current account reversals under the gold standard could be substantial.  
Eyeballing the data suggests that prior to 1914 the drop in output only commenced after a 
year or more, whereas after 1971 it more commonly set in immediately.  An explanation 
for this different pattern is the greater incidence of currency crises after 1971, as noted 
above, and the tendency for output to fall with the onset of a crisis.  Consistent with this 
conjecture, Bordo and Eichengreen (2003) identify currency crises coincident with only 7 
per cent of the current account reversals occurring before 1914 but coincident with 12 per 
cent of the reversals occurring after 1971.   
To determine whether the results were sensitive to this timing, we redefined the 
output response as the change in GDP not between year t (the year of the reversal) and 
t+3 but between year t+1 and t+4.  When we do this, the negative coefficient on the gold 
standard dummy is no longer significantly different from zero.  (The other results are 
unchanged.)  This suggests that not too much weight should be attached to the results in 
Table 6 suggesting that the output losses from reversals were smaller under the gold 
standard.  Reversals may have been less frequent and smaller, but when they occurred 
their output effects could still be severe, especially when they were accompanied by a 
currency crisis.  (See the next section.)   
In comparison, a variety of further sensitivity analyses had little impact on the 
results.  For example, when we added a vector of country fixed effects, the basic results 
continue to hold.  We also experimented with a number of additional explanatory 
variables.  For instance, a potential explanation for why the output effects of reversals 
were smaller in some periods than others is that the reversals themselves were smaller.    22 
We therefore added the size of the reversal (measured here as the change in the current 
account ratio between time t-3 and time t) as an additional explanatory variable.  This has 
plausible effects; for example, it lowers the significance level on the gold standard 
dummy in Table 6, suggesting that one reason that the output losses associated with 
current account reversals were smaller under the gold standard is that the magnitude of 
the reversals themselves were smaller.  However, the new coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero, and the other results are little affected by its addition.  Finally, we 
followed Edwards (2004a) in estimating treatment regressions, first an equation for 
current account reversals and then a second stage regression that treats the reversal 
variable as endogenous.
23  The results, in Table 7, are consistent with their predecessors.  
Reversals are more likely in countries that had been running large external deficits in the 
immediately preceding period and where growth was slow.  They continue to cause 
significant output losses, although output begins bouncing back relatively quickly. 
   In sum, the results here suggest that the gold-standard period was different: 
current account reversals were less frequent and smaller than they have become 
subsequently, although when they did occur their output effects could be substantial.  The 
years since 1972 do not compare unfavorably in these respects with the 1920s and 1930s; 
if anything the opposite is true.  But reversals today are more frequent and larger than 
they were before 1914.  Obvious measures of country characteristics and global 
economic conditions do not seem to account for this difference.  This motivates us to 
look more closely at a number of episodes of sharp current account reversals before 1913 
to see whether this can help us to understand better what is going on.  
                                                 
23 In the first stage, probit estimates of the treatment equation are obtained. From these estimates a hazard is 
then computed. In the second stage, the hazard is included in the estimation of the outcome equation. This 
augmented outcome equation lets us get consistent estimates of the regression disturbance term.    23 
 
6. Case Studies 
In this section we consider three prominent pre-1914 current account reversals: 
Argentina in 1889-90, Australia in 1891-2, Brazil in 1896-7. 
A.  Argentina 1889-90.  The 1880s was a golden decade for Argentina.  The 
wool and wheat producers of the pampas were integrated into world markets by the 
construction of ports and railways.
24  Argentina already had 2,500 kilometers of railroad 
track in 1880, and its ample endowment of productive land promised the traffic to 
support many more.  Labor arrived in abundance; slow growth in Europe, depressed 
conditions in that continent’s agrarian economies, and cheap international passenger rates 
combined to encourage more than one million immigrant arrivals between 1880 and 
1890.  (Argentine government propaganda and subsidies for travel costs did not hurt.)  
While only some two thirds of these immigrants settled permanently, this was a very 
large increase in labor supply for a country with an 1880 population of only two million. 
Britons in particular were galvanized by the attractions of investment in this 
economy: new capital calls in London on behalf of the country rose from little more than 
£½ million a year between 1875 and 1880 to nearly £5 million a year between 1881 and 
1885 and then £17.5 million annually between 1886 and 1890.
25  The British lent for 
railway construction, for the improvement of port facilities, for the development of urban 
infrastructure (most of the immigrants of the 1880s settling in the cities), and for the 
system of ranches and meatpacking plants that allowed the exportation of canned and, 
eventually, chilled beef.  They were active participants in the real estate, securities 
                                                 
24 Wheat was first exported in 1878. 
25 Stone (1999), Table 3.  British investment accounted for the majority but certainly not the entirety of 
European investment in Argentina in this period; see Ford (1962).   24 
market, and banking booms of the period, and they lent extensively to politically-
connected provisional mortgage banks. 
While domestic and foreign economic events go some way toward explaining 
these developments, their timing cannot be understood without reference to the political 
consolidation that occurred in Argentina in the 1880s.  This was the period when the 
central state, bolstered by recent military victories, asserted its authority over the 
provinces and the economy.  The rebellion of the province of Buenos Aires was defeated 
in 1880, and the city was transformed into the federal capital.  The state then established 
dominion over the regions inhabited by indigenous peoples.  The territorial limits of the 
nation were, for the first time, clearly defined.  Starting in 1880 a new institutional 
framework was created based on strong presidential power, checks and balances 
exercised by the congress, and prohibition of presidential reelection.  A uniform national 
money was finally established.  Basic fiscal, administrative and judicial powers were 
defined (Botana 1997).  Although Romero (2002) remarks that some of these powers 
were more notional than real, it is clear that this picture did much to enhance investor 
confidence in the administrative capacity of the state.  And this in turn facilitated foreign 
finance for Argentina’s twin deficits. 
Thus, the growth of the current account deficit in the 1880s resulted from a 
combination of domestic economic and political factors.  Investment was encouraged by 
the exceptional commercial opportunities afforded by a period of geographical 
expansion, integration into world markets, large-scale immigration, and political 
consolidation; meanwhile the working-age population was increasingly dominated by 
recent immigrants as yet in no position to support high savings rates.  The central   25 
government reinforced the disparity by undertaking public investment projects while 
running deficits.  For better or worse, the consolidation of the state in the 1880s and the 
extensive guarantees provided for private investment (investments in railways in 
particular) encouraged foreigners to help finance the difference.
26  Not least among the 
beneficiaries was the government itself, which could borrow abroad in order to finance 
public spending on projects that benefited its clients.  Cronyism similarly prevailed in the 
provinces, whose governments used provincial banks to contract foreign loans and use 
the proceeds to extend credit to the provincial government.     
Maintenance of this fragile equilibrium depended on two conditions.  First, there 
was a considerable gestation period between the initial investment in export-oriented 
infrastructure and the coming on line of exports.  Keeping current in the interim on short-
run debt-service obligations hinged on the willingness of foreign investors to provide a 
steady stream of bridge finance.  Between 1885 and 1890, as Ford (1962, p.87) observes, 
“to some considerable extent foreign borrowings were employed in paying service 
charges on previous foreign loans…” One potential explanation for why current account 
reversals were smaller and less frequent than in subsequent periods is that current account 
deficits reflected high levels of export-oriented infrastructure investment – that is, foreign 
capital was devoted to uses that generated additional export revenues that could be used 
to make debt service payments in the normal course of events (see Feis 1930, Fishlow 
1986, and the discussion above).  Analysis of the Argentine case suggests that this factor 
may be subject to exaggeration.  Natural complementarities there may have been, but 
gestation periods were long. 
                                                 
26 Money finance contributed also, Argentina having gone off the gold standard in 1884.   26 
Second, this happy equilibrium hinged on the credibility of the government’s 
commitments.  Paying out on its guarantees required a healthy rise in public-sector 
revenues; here the gestation period between the initial investment projects and the 
induced rise in economic activity again posed a problem.  Insofar as some of the projects 
that the government guaranteed were of low quality – they were likely to neither pay for 
themselves nor to induce an increase in revenues through other channels – the authorities 
might find themselves unable to uphold their part of the bargain.  At that point, capital 
inflows might dry up, forcing the current account deficit to be compressed.     
Thus, the Argentine episode displays many of the characteristics identified in the 
preceding analyses as raising the likelihood of current account reversals and heightening 
their output effects, prominent among them large budget and current account deficits in 
the run-up to the event.  In addition, explanations for the Argentine crisis in this period 
invoke two factors also emphasized in modern studies that do not show up in other gold-
standard era reversals: tight credit conditions and slowing growth in the center.  The 
importing country on which Argentina depended most heavily, Great Britain, experienced 
a cyclical peak in 1885, and its economy remained officially in recession through 1889 
(the latter being the conventionally-dated business cycle trough).  This made growing 
Argentine exports more difficult.  At the same time, the stability of British savings rates 
and hence the inverse fluctuation of home and foreign investment (Cairncross 1953) 
meant that ample British capital was available to Argentina and other contemporary 
emerging markets from the middle of the decade.   
But these same relationships rendered Argentina vulnerable to a decline in the 
availability of finance when British growth began to accelerate and investment picked up   27 
starting in 1889, and when the Bank of England began raising rates.  Overall, the 1880s 
was a decade of low interest rates, reflecting relatively weak investment demand in 
Europe.  Goshen’s 1888 debt conversion took advantage of this fact and put further 
downward pressure on yields.  Low interest rates encouraged investors to look abroad for 
higher yields.  As Bailey (1959, p.272) put it, London and Edinburgh were soon 
“honeycombed with agencies” for collecting money for overseas investments.  But in 
1889, the cyclical trough had passed, and British activity began to accelerate.  The Bank 
of England ratcheted up its discount rate sharply, from 2 ½ to 6 per cent over the second 
half of the year.  It is not surprising that this led to a decline in new issues in London on 
behalf of Argentina and made it difficult for Barings to place the Buenos Aires Water 
Supply and Drainage Loan.  Foreign financial factors clearly played a role in this current 
account reversal, although it can perhaps be argued that it would have occurred, with or 
without sharp changes in the Bank of England’s discount rate.
27   
With the failure of the Buenos Aires waterworks loan and the distress experienced 
by Barings, lending to Argentina ground to a halt.  Reversing the current account balance 
was painful when the prior deficit was so large and the government budget was in deficit.  
Successive governments struggled, with little success, to balance the budget through a 
combination of tax increases and expenditure reductions and thereby limit the need for 
monetization and inflation.  The need to compress imports in order to facilitate current 
account adjustment further complicated this task, since import duties were the single 
most import source of revenues for the federal government.  Moreover, compressing 
imports by 50 per cent in 1891 and then boosting exports required sharp depreciation of 
                                                 
27 Given its prominence in this case, just why the British discount rate does not show up more generally in 
our regressions explaining the incidence of current account reversals remains a something of a mystery.   28 
the real exchange rate, which further eroded domestic living standards and depressed 
consumption.  Real GDP contracted by 4 per cent in 1890 and by a further 11 per cent in 
1891 before bouncing back to plus 9 per cent in 1892 and 5 per cent in 1893.  Thus, by 
the end of 1893 output was roughly back up to where it had been in 1889.
28  Still, this 
was a large output drop by the standards of contemporary current account reversals, 
reflecting the unfavorable initial conditions.   
On the other hand, this was not an exceptionally long recession; that growth was 
again positive little more than two years after the reversal was not atypical.
29  Historians 
point to a number of factors helping to avert a more extended recession.  Argentina 
avoided having to compress demand still more sharply and to move the current account 
into surplus even further by restructuring its debt, first suspending payments, then 
obtaining a bridge loan through the Rothschild Committee sufficient to finance the 
federal government’s debt service for three years, securing a reduction of debt service 
and holiday on amortization payments, and finally assuming the provincial debt at less 
than 60 per cent of its face value.
30  As a region of overseas European settlement 
dominated by recent immigrant arrivals, labor exhibited an unusual degree of 
intersectoral mobility, moving smoothly from the production of nontraded to traded 
goods in response to the depreciation of the real exchange rate.
31  World demand 
conditions were favorable; export prices rose over much of the 1890s, and there was a 
                                                 
28 Living standards and imports in particular remained below earlier levels, however (Argentine imports not 
again reaching1889 levels until 1904). 
29 Fishlow (1989b) observes that “the data on railway receipts are suggestive of a less severe and prolonged 
downturn than other peripheral economies experienced during the 1890s.” 
30 Perhaps not too much should be claimed of this factor, for these negotiations took many years to 
complete and were a pervasive source of demoralizing financial uncertainty while still underway. 
31 Fishlow (1989a,b) emphasizes labor market flexibility as a factor in adjustment.   29 
positive technology shock with the coming on line of large scale exports of chilled beef.
32  
Some of these factors are policies that governments might attempt to pursue in order to 
cope with current account reversals.  But others reflect factors having to do with the 
structure of markets and the development of technology over which they have little 
control.     
B.  Brazil 1896-7.  Brazil’s reversal took place later than Argentina’s, although it 
was affected by the same global economic and financial developments.  Between 1886 
and 1890 Brazil imported only about 40 per cent as much British capital as Argentina, 
despite enjoying the same low global interest rates.  In part this reflected the prevailing 
commitment to fiscal orthodoxy and the desire to restore the milreis to its official 1846 
par; this more conservative fiscal stance limited the magnitude of the subsequent twin 
deficits.  In part the difference reflected the fact that Brazilian publicity and propaganda 
were less effective.  It took the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the end of the monarchy 
in 1889 to really put the country on the “radar screen” of international investors.
33   
As in Argentina, the government then used fiscal largess to buy and maintain the 
political support of the military and the provinces.  In the Brazilian case there was also 
the fact that the abolition of slavery imposed financial losses on powerful agricultural 
interests.  The latter sought preferential access to cheap credit to compensate for the 
capital losses suffered as a result of emancipation.
34  Thus, following the proclamation of 
the republic in 1889, domestic interest rates were kept low and the exchange rate was 
allowed to depreciate.  Sauce for the goose being sauce for the gander, financial 
                                                 
32 While Cardoso (1989) emphasizes this factor in explaining Argentina’s recovery from the 1890-92 crisis, 
in reality it comes a bit late to explain the questions at hand here (Argentina exports of chilled beef rise to 
significant levels only in the second half of the 1890s). 
33 To be sure, British investors had preferred Brazil earlier in the 19
th century, but not in the 1880s. 
34 See Fishlow (1989a), pp.22-23.   30 
preferences were extended to industry as well.  The speculative boom which resulted 
from the ample provision of credit, financed partly by domestic money creation and 
partly by foreign borrowing, is known in the Brazilian literature as the Encilhamento.  So 
soon after the abolition of slavery, and with continuing political uncertainty, domestic 
conditions were not conducive to high domestic savings rates.  The investment 
encouraged by the ample availability of credit thus bequeathed chronic current account 
deficits. 
  It is striking, given the recent literature on contagion, that Brazil did not 
experience a current account reversal, as we measure the phenomenon, at this time.  As 
Cardoso and Dornbusch (1989) note, negative financial spillovers from Argentina to 
Brazil were limited.  Part of the explanation, for this as for many things Brazilian, is 
coffee prices, which strengthened from 1890.  But another part may lie in the fact that 
Brazil satisfies less well the leading indicators of vulnerability to a current account 
reversal.  While current account deficits were chronic, they were not allowed to widen to 
the same extent as in Argentina; Brazil was never the darling of foreign investors to the 
same extent.  Although the commitment to fiscal orthodoxy weakened after the 1880s, 
the legacy lived on; budget deficits were never allowed to explode as they did in 
Argentina.  Less pressure of demand meant less tendency toward overvaluation, which 
further slowed the development of a patently unsustainable external position.  As a result 
the country retained limited capital market access: Brazil was able to contract new loans 
in London, most prominently in 1893 and 1895 but also a short-term advance in 1896.   
  In this manner Brazil staggered into the second half of the 1890s.  Limited capital 
market access to finance ongoing deficits allowed the debt to continue rising, which   31 
inevitably contributed to growing unease on the part of foreign investors.  After 1893, 
coffee prices weakened, bringing the situation to a head.  By 1896 funding for the current 
account deficit had dried up.  The trade balance swung from a deficit of a bit less than 
one per cent of GDP to a surplus of more than five percent, reflecting the magnitude of 
ongoing debt service obligations.  Like Argentina before it, Brazil now secured a funding 
loan from its London bankers, in this case sufficient to cover the central government’s 
interest payments for three years.  In addition amortization obligations were suspended 
for 13 years.  Fishlow (1989a) notes that since the effective debt write-down was less 
than in Argentina (where the issue had been forced by the government’s unilateral 
suspension of payments), reliance on internal adjustment measures was necessarily 
greater.  The budgetary problem was addressed by raising tax rates and extending them to 
new products, imposing surcharges on customs duties, and renting the federal railways to 
private enterprises.  The exchange rate was stabilized by withdrawing Treasury notes 
from circulation, as required by the conditions attached to the funding loan. 
  This sharp deflation, presided over by Finance Minister Joaquim Murtinho, 
sharply compressed domestic demand.  Imports fell, partly owing to depressed demand 
but also due to the import surcharges, while more domestic production was freed up for 
export.  Trade deficits gave way to ongoing surpluses, which grew larger after 1900.  But 
the greater reliance in Brazil on deflationary adjustment measures also meant that the 
output effects of the reversal were as severe as in Argentina, notwithstanding the fact that 
prior conditions would have indicated a less severe recession.  Adjustment took place 
mainly through the collapse of investment; the trade statistics show a sharp decline in 
imports of industrial equipment.  National income estimates suggest that GDP declined   32 
by 10 per cent in 1897 and 5 per cent in 1898, mirroring the 1890-1 contraction in 
Argentina, before stabilizing in 1899, and then beginning to grow again quite sharply 
starting in 1900, aided by strengthening coffee prices and the coming on line of rubber 
exports (although not soon enough to prevent a crisis in a banking system severely 
weakened by preceding events).   
  Thus, the Brazilian case is a reminder that the output effects of a current account 
reversal depend not just on inherited macroeconomic and financial conditions but also on 
how the reversal is managed.   
  C.  Australia 1891-2.  In Australia, whose reversal was bracketed temporally by 
those of Argentina and Brazil, the government resorted to neither currency depreciation 
nor default.   While many of the other circumstances surrounding this episode were 
similar to those in Argentina and Brazil, imperial identity meant that default and 
depreciation were essentially inconceivable.  Even more than in Brazil, then, the burden 
of adjustment fell on the domestic economy.  In Australia, GDP fell for four years 
running, from 1890 through 1893, not “just” two.  The cumulative fall was on the order 
of 25 per cent, not “just” 15.  Unemployment rose sharply.  Immigration slowed and 
tentatively reversed direction.  Social disorder spread, led by protesting sheep shearers, 
dock workers, and miners. Post-1893 recovery, if it may be called that, was slow and 
uneven.  A summary measure of the severity of the consequent recession is the 
comparison with Argentina: whereas Argentine real GDP doubled between 1890 and 
1905 according to the conventional national income statistics, Australian GDP in 1905 
was a mere 20 per cent above what it had been a decade and a half before.  This is 
especially impressive given that the absolute swing in the trade balance ratio, from -2.0   33 
per cent of GDP in the three pre-reversal years to +0.4 per cent of GDP in the year of the 
event, was small by the standards of the other countries we are considering. 
  Australia had been experiencing an investment boom, based in substantial part on 
investment by nonresidents, off and on since the gold rushes of 1851.  Much of this 
overseas finance was devoted to speculative assets, including pastoral and urban land.  
Like the government of Argentina, the governments of Queensland and New South 
Wales subsidized the fares of immigrants.  Self-reinforcing capital and labor inflows 
fanned a speculative building boom.  The urban land boom came to a head in the 1880s, 
fueled by rapid increases in mortgage lending by savings banks.  As a share of GDP, 
bank credit (much of which was backed by foreign liabilities) doubled between 1880 and 
1890.  The majority of the increase went into residential construction, since the rate of 
return on pastoral activities was declining and the ‘eighties was a decade of urbanization.  
Land and housing prices shot up in Melbourne in particular.   
As in Argentina and Brazil, these developments were not unrelated to the 
activities of government, the individual colonial governments in particular.  The 
Australian colonies competed with one another to attract both labor and capital, 
borrowing to build railways into the interior and providing urban amenities to appeal to 
recent settlers.  As McLean (1996) puts it, many of these investment projects were based 
on overly optimistic assessments of the agricultural potential of the semi-arid regions of 
the interior (reflecting temporarily favorable climatic conditions).
35  In the second half of 
the 1880s, they reflected the tendency for low interest rates in Britain to encourage 
relatively indiscriminate borrowing and lending.  So long as growth prospects were rosy, 
                                                 
35 Very much the same syndrome, reflecting the same climatic conditions, was evident in the United States 
at this time.   34 
government guarantees for the bonds underwriting the investments were credible.  And, 
of course, these projects were associated with large current account deficits reflecting the 
propensity to import locomotives, steel rail, and a wide range of other investment goods. 
  The stop to lending that followed the Baring Crisis was more pronounced in 
Australia than in Brazil.  Capital inflows fell from £20 million in 1888 to £1 million in 
1893.  It is tempting to speculate that British investors were impressed by the similar 
resource endowments of the two pastoral economies and revised their expectations 
accordingly – although the fact that the curtailment of lending and current account 
reversal took place fully a year after the Baring Crisis is difficult to reconcile with this 
hypothesis.  Given that “the imperial and Commonwealth tie” (in the language of Lindert 
and Morton 1989) closed off other options, harsh deflationary policies became the order 
of the day.  There was no depreciation of the currency.  Rather, relative prices had to 
adjust through a grinding downward movement of wages and costs.  Demand was 
compressed by tight credit, which discouraged consumption and, in particular, 
investment.  Capital formation fell from £34 million in 1888 to £16 million in 1892 and 
£9 million in 1893.  State budgets were brought into rapid balance, further compressing 
demand.  Despite the stop to borrowing, government debt as a share of GDP rose sharply 
with declining nominal income through the middle of the 1890s.  Meanwhile, there was 
no relief from the interest burden like that obtained by Argentina (and no delay of 
amortization like that enjoyed by Brazil): debt service continued to account for nearly 10 
per cent of GDP.  This meant that imports had to be compressed sharply.  In contrast, 
exports were maintained at previous levels (unlike Argentina and Brazil, they did not rise 
significantly in the wake of the reversal, presumably reflecting the stagnation of the   35 
economy).  Reflecting the impact of deflation, the export share rose from 20 to 28 per 
cent of GDP in the first half of the 1890s. 
  The story would not be complete without reference to the drought that started in 
1895, which nipped the economy’s recovery in the bud.  What coffee was to Brazil, wool 
was to Australia, and the drought of the mid-1890s had a devastating impact on the 
pastoral economy.  Thus, climate and not simply policy may explain why recovery in 
Australia was so difficult and long in coming.  However, drought was not an exclusively 
Australian phenomenon in the 1890s, so the decline in pastoral production was offset to 
an extent by strong prices.  In addition, drought in 1895 cannot explain why the economy 
contracted so persistently and severely between 1890 and 1893.  Here the fact that the 
domestic economy was forced to shoulder the entire burden of adjustment to the current 
account reversal cannot be denied. 
 
7. Conclusion 
  In this paper we have presented some new facts and a mystery.  The new facts 
concern the pre-1970 history of international capital flows and current account reversals.  
Analyzing a sample of countries with per capita GDPs at least 60 per cent those of the 
lead country and measuring reversals in a consistent way, we find that the incidence of 
reversals has been unusually great in recent years.  The only prior period that matched the 
last three decades in terms of the frequency and magnitude of reversals was the 1920s 
and 1930s, decades notorious for the instability of capital flows.  In contrast, reversals 
were both less common and smaller in the Bretton Woods and pre-World War I gold 
standard eras.    36 
That the Bretton Woods years were different is no surprise: capital controls were 
widespread and financial flows across borders were suppressed.  Current account 
reversals were fewer because current account deficits were smaller, reflecting this limited 
finance.  At the same time, when reversals did occur, their effects could be severe. 
That reversals were relatively few and small before 1914 is striking, given the 
absence of impediments to capital flows and the large size of current account balances.  
This finding is clearly related to the much commented upon smooth operation of the 
prewar gold standard.  Cross-country regressions and case studies alike suggest that the 
same observable characteristics of countries (large current account and budget deficits in 
the run-up, followed by negative shocks to growth at home and abroad) help to explain 
the incidence of reversals both before 1914 and after 1971. But controlling for these 
characteristics of countries and reversal periods does not make the contrast between the 
gold standard and recent years go away.  Ultimately, why reversals were not more 
frequent and larger in the period of open capital markets a century ago is still a mystery.  
To put it another way, the smooth operation of the classical gold standard remains be 
explained.         37 
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1880-1889  3.8  3.9
a 
1890-1913  3.6  3.7 
1919-1926  3.9  3.9 
1927-1931  2.7  2.7 
1932-1939  1.5  1.5 
1947-1959  2.4  1.8 
1960-1973  1.9  1.3 
1974-1989  4.8  2.2 
1990-2000  4.7  2.3 
 
a  This figure is from Taylor (1996); Obstfeld and Taylor (1994) provide a statistic for the 
longer period 1870-1889. 
 
Source: see text.   41 
Table 2. Estimates of Savings-Retention Coefficient for 
Successive Five-Year Periods, Current Sample 
 
Period  Coef.  Std. Err.  95% Conf.  Interval 
1880-1884  0.534  0.198  0.099  0.970 
1885-1889  0.311  0.145  -0.003  0.625 
1890-1894  0.536  0.141  0.231  0.840 
1895-1899  0.668  0.114  0.421  0.915 
1900-1904  0.548  0.132  0.262  0.833 
1905-1909  0.567  0.207  0.119  1.014 
1910-1914  0.581  0.206  0.135  1.027 
1920-1924  0.590  0.219  0.107  1.073 
1925-1929  0.613  0.196  0.185  1.041 
1930-1934  0.783  0.074  0.622  0.944 
1935-1939  0.927  0.068  0.780  1.075 
1945-1949  0.667  0.128  0.395  0.939 
1950-1954  0.721  0.069  0.576  0.866 
1955-1959  0.778  0.057  0.659  0.897 
1960-1964  0.744  0.084  0.570  0.919 
1965-1969  0.887  0.073  0.737  1.037 
1970-1974  0.863  0.069  0.719  1.007 
1975-1979  0.708  0.111  0.478  0.938 
1980-1984  0.623  0.124  0.368  0.878 
1985-1989  0.699  0.122  0.448  0.951 
1990-1994  0.598  0.113  0.365  0.832 
1995-1999  0.452  0.112  0.222  0.683 
 
Source: see text.   42 
 
Table 3. Time Distribution of Reversals 
 
   Pre-1885  1885-1889  1890-1894  1895-1899  1900-1904  1905-1909  1910-1914  Total 
REV1                          
No Reversal  26  77  67  76  79  93  66  484 
Reversal  2  5  18  9  13  2  10  59 
REV2                  
No Reversal  28  81  76  83  86  94  73  521 
Reversal    1  9  2  6  1  3  22 
   1918-1922  1923-1927  1928-1932  1933-1937  1938          
REV1                          
No Reversal  40  66  67  83  18      274 
Reversal  28  27  32  14  1      102 
REV2                  
No Reversal  45  74  76  88  19      302 
Reversal  23  19  23  9        74 
   1945-1949  1950-1954  1955-1959  1960-1964  1965-1969  1970-1972       
REV1                          
No Reversal  52  79  94  97  94  57    473 
Reversal  20  21  6  3  6  6    62 
REV2                  
No Reversal  54  89  98  100  100  63    504 
Reversal  18  11  2          31 
   1970-1974  1975-1979  1980-1984  1985-1989  1990-1994  1995-1998       
REV1                          
No Reversal  96  179  179  198  213  104    969 
Reversal  24  58  97  88  74  20    361 
REV2                  
No Reversal  17  193  209  221  242  114    996 
Reversal  13  44  67  65  45  10     244 
 
Notes: REV1 and REV2 refer to a fall in the current account deficit of at least 2 per cent 
or three per cent over three years with respect to the preceding three years. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics For GDP Growth (Reversal and No-Reversal Episodes) 
 
     Mean  St. Dev  t-stat 
Gold Standard          
Year of   Reversal  2.79  5.08  -0.03 
  No Rev  2.81  0.95    
1  Reversal  1.15  4.70  -0.80 
  No Rev  1.95  1.31    
2  Reversal  3.59  6.28  0.95 
  No Rev  2.38  1.59    
3  Reversal  6.22  4.14  4.51 
  No Rev  2.45  1.36    
4  Reversal  3.47  5.35  0.26 
  No Rev  3.10  1.43    
Interwar             
Year of   Reversal  0.60  6.83  -2.57 
  No Rev  3.28  4.77    
1  Reversal  3.28  14.28  -0.33 
  No Rev  4.03  4.81    
2  Reversal  3.96  11.18  -0.41 
  No Rev  4.66  4.19    
3  Reversal  3.32  6.60  -1.44 
  No Rev  4.63  4.41    
4  Reversal  5.61  5.16  1.43 
   No Rev  4.31  3.87    
 
Notes: t-statistics reported for two-sided null hypothesis of no difference between 
reversals and non-reversals. t-statistics in bold indicate rejection of the null 
hypothesis. 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics (Continued) 
 
      Mean  St. Dev  t-stat 
Bretton Woods        
Year of   Reversal  5.39  3.91  -2.50 
  No Rev  9.14  5.69    
1  Reversal  6.94  6.03  -1.89 
  No Rev  9.94  6.34    
2  Reversal  6.15  5.19  -1.30 
  No Rev  8.05  5.39    
3  Reversal  4.74  4.72  -1.28 
  No Rev  6.19  3.14    
4  Reversal  5.21  5.03  -0.95 
  No Rev  6.37  2.77    
Post 
1970             
Year of   Reversal  1.85  5.53  -3.30 
  No Rev  3.57  1.42    
1  Reversal  2.73  5.82  -1.44 
  No Rev  3.45  1.13    
2  Reversal  3.85  4.64  1.09 
  No Reve  3.40  1.11    
3  Reversal  4.12  6.01  1.42 
  No Rev  3.36  1.34    
4  Reversal  4.00  5.78  1.86 
   No Rev  2.88  1.15    
 
Notes: t-statistics reported for two-sided null hypothesis of no difference between 
reversals and non-reversals. t-statistics in bold represent a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. 
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Table 5. Indicators of Reversals 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
GDP per capita  -0.205**  -0.205  -0.177  -0.300***  -0.300  -0.272 
   (0.099)  (0.154)  (0.152)  (0.108)  (0.184)  (0.183) 
Fiscal balance/GDP  -0.014**  -0.014  -0.013  -0.016**  -0.016*  -0.014 
   (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Trade balance/GDP  -0.033***  -0.033***  -0.035***  -0.032***  -0.032***  -0.034*** 
   (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
UK/US interest rate  0.011  0.011  0.016  0.009  0.009  0.017 
   (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Lagged UK/US growth  -0.024***  -0.024***  -0.019***  -0.024***  -0.024***  -0.020*** 
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
UK/US growth  0.004  0.004  0.006  0.007  0.007  0.007 
   (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010) 
Peg  -0.063  -0.063  -0.044  -0.091  -0.091  -0.073 
   (0.075)  (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.078)  (0.100)  (0.101) 
Gold Standard 
Dummy  -0.389***  -0.389**  -0.372**  -0.434***  -0.434**  -0.439** 
   (0.115)  (0.178)  (0.177)  (0.132)  (0.192)  (0.193) 
Interwar Dummy  0.142  0.142  0.137  0.092  0.092  0.067 
   (0.102)  (0.135)  (0.139)  (0.121)  (0.148)  (0.154) 
BW Dummy  -0.338***  -0.338**  -0.349**  -0.330***  -0.330**  -0.329* 
   (0.107)  (0.153)  (0.156)  (0.112)  (0.165)  (0.169) 
Deficit  0.164**  0.164**  0.165**  0.134*  0.134*  0.135* 
   (0.069)  (0.069)  (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.073) 
Openness  0.004***  0.004**  0.004**  0.004***  0.004**  0.003** 
   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Capital Controls        -0.102  -0.102  -0.127 
         (0.091)  (0.134)  (0.135) 
Constant  -1.030***  -1.030***  -1.062***  -0.879***  -0.879***  -0.891*** 
   (0.110)  (0.147)  (0.148)  (0.135)  (0.177)  (0.180) 
Observations  1978  1978  1895  1869  1869  1793 
Log-likelihood:  -894.13  -894.13  -864.97  -836.52  -836.52  -810.56 
pseudo-R^2:  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
 
Note: Dependent variable takes the value 1 if a reversal of at least 2 % takes place and 0 
otherwise.  Standard errors in parentheses,* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All the explanatory variables are lagged once. The variable trade 
balance to GDP ratio is averaged over the three years before the event to maintain 
consistency with the definition of reversals. Government surplus to GDP, world interest 
rate and growth rates are levels. 
 
Source: see text.   46 
Table 6.  Consequences of Reversals 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Trade balance/GDP  0.077***  0.115***  0.077  0.115  0.085***  0.129* 
   (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.069)  (0.082)  (0.028)  (0.075) 
RER overvaluation  -0.166***  -0.180***  -0.166***  -0.180***  -0.156***  -0.169*** 
   (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.044)  (0.031)  (0.021)  (0.032) 
UK/US interest rate  0.055  0.092  0.055  0.092  0.046  0.075 
   (0.069)  (0.065)  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.071)  (0.073) 
UK/US interest 
rate(+1)  0.051  0.031  0.051  0.031  0.082  0.073 
   (0.077)  (0.073)  (0.072)  (0.066)  (0.079)  (0.070) 
Gold Standard 
Dummy  0.913**  0.445  0.913  0.445  0.668  0.013 
   (0.445)  (0.556)  (0.918)  (1.056)  (0.503)  (1.426) 
Interwar Dummy  -2.788***  -3.257***  -2.788***  -3.257***  -3.959***  -4.702*** 
   (0.477)  (0.568)  (0.863)  (0.967)  (0.533)  (1.379) 
BW Dummy  -2.708**  -3.394**  -2.708  -3.394  -2.707*  -2.806 
   (1.359)  (1.398)  (3.100)  (3.045)  (1.482)  (3.279) 
Size of Reversal    -0.097**    -0.097*    -0.679 
     (0.042)    (0.051)    (0.414) 
Capital Controls          -0.391  -0.068 
           (0.405)  (0.048) 
External Def. Dum.          -0.749*  -0.828 
           (0.395)  (1.251) 
Constant  0.267  1.060**  0.267  1.060  0.889*  1.749 
   (0.297)  (0.513)  (0.685)  (0.955)  (0.462)  (1.383) 
Observations  318  222  318  222  288  199 
R-squared  0.21  0.28  0.21  0.28  0.26  0.33 
 
 Notes: Estimated using OLS with White' s correction for heteroscedasticity. Standard 
errors in parentheses,* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Reversal defined according to rev1. The dependent variable is output growth defined as 3 
year averages, expressed as deviations from world averages. The explanatory variables 
trade balance, the real exchange rate and the UK/US interest rates areaveraged over the 
three years before the event.  
 
Source: see text.   47 
 Table 7.  Causes and Effects of Current Account Reversals: Two-Step Estimates,  
(top panel shows growth regression, bottom panel determinants of reversals) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Initial Log GDP per capita -0.459***  -0.483***  -0.535*** 
  (0.136)  (0.136)  (0.135) 
Pop. Growth  0.564***  0.539***  0.450*** 
  (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.100) 
Fiscal Surplus/GDP  0.114***  0.112***  0.113*** 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Peg  0.313  0.329  0.305 
  (0.243)  (0.244)  (0.242) 
Capital Controls  0.702***  0.653***  0.654*** 
  (0.237)  (0.237)  (0.235) 
Reversal  -4.825***  -5.700***  -6.022*** 
  (1.095)  (1.139)  (1.137) 
Lagged Rev.  1.147***  0.562 
    (0.335)  (0.391) 
Lagged (2) Rev.    0.878*** 
         (0.335) 
Trade Balance/GDP  -0.033***  -0.032***  -0.031*** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Growth  -0.022***  -0.024***  -0.023*** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Money/Reserves  -0.009*  -0.009*  -0.009* 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Prewar Dummy  -0.591***  -0.572***  -0.566*** 
  (0.118)  (0.119)  (0.120) 
Interwar Dummy  -0.053  -0.046  -0.052 
  (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.115) 
BW Dummy  -0.726***  -0.717***  -0.741*** 
  (0.107)  (0.108)  (0.109) 
Lambda  2.164***  2.282***  2.490*** 
  (0.649)  (0.666)  (0.665) 
Observations  1919  1890  1855 
 
Source: see text.  48 
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Note: War years are excluded from the sample. 
 
Source: see text.   49 
 
Figure 2. Plot of Savings-Retention Coefficients and Confidence Intervals, 















Note: war years are excluded from the sample. 
 
Source: see text.  50 
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Table A1. Countries in the Sample 
 
1880-1914  1918-1939  1945-1971  1972-1998   
Argentina  Argentina  Argentina  Algeria  Romania 
Australia  Australia  Australia  Argentina  Russia 
Austria  Belgium  Austria  Australia  Seychelles 
Brazil  Brazil  Belgium  Austria  Singapore 
Canada  Canada  Brazil  Barbados  South Africa 
Denmark  Denmark  Canada  Belgium  Spain 
Finland  Finland  Denmark  Belize  Sweden 
France  France  Egypt  Brazil  Switzerland 
Germany  Germany  Finland  Canada  Thailand 
Italy  Greece  France  Chile  Trinidad and Tobago 
Japan  Italy  Germany  Colombia  Turkey 
Netherlands  Japan  Greece  Costa Rica  United Kingdom 
Norway  Netherlands  India  Denmark  United States 
Portugal  Norway  Italy  Egypt  Uruguay 
Spain  Portugal  Japan  Finland  Venezuela 
Sweden  Spain  Mexico  Fiji   
Switzerland  Sweden  New Zealand  France   
United Kingdom  Switzerland  Netherlands  Gabon   
United States  United Kingdom  Norway  Germany   
  United States  Portugal  Grenada   
    South Africa  Greece   
    Spain  Hungary   
    Sweden  Iceland   
    Switzerland  Ireland   
    Turkey  Iran   
    Uruguay  Israel   
    USSR  Italy   
    United Kingdom  Jamaica   
    United States  Japan   
      Jordan   
      Korea   
      Malaysia   
      Mexico   
      Malta   
 
Source: see text.  53 
 
 
Table A2.  Incidence of Reversals: Gold Standard and Interwar Periods 
                         
Country  Year  Country  Year 
Argentina  1885  Argentina  1924 
Argentina  1889  Argentina  1926 
Argentina  1898  Argentina  1931 
Australia  1891  Australia  1931 
Australia  1903  Belgium  1927 
Brazil  1884  Brazil  1923 
Brazil  1886  Brazil  1929 
Brazil  1897  Canada  1923 
Brazil  1899  Canada  1932 
Canada  1891  Denmark  1921 
Canada  1913  Denmark  1925 
Denmark  1886  Finland  1918 
Denmark  1890  Finland  1929 
Denmark  1901  France  1919 
Denmark  1908  Germany  1928 
Finland  1884  Greece  1930 
Finland  1892  Italy  1919 
Finland  1901  Italy  1931 
Finland  1913  Japan  1927 
Germany  1913  Netherlands  1921 
Japan  1899  Netherlands  1932 
Japan  1901  Norway  1922 
Netherlands  1911  Norway  1931 
Norway  1901  Portugal  1924 
Sweden  1887  Spain  1925 
Sweden  1891  Sweden  1922 
Sweden  1910  Switzerland  1921 
Switzerland  1892  Switzerland  1933 
Switzerland  1899  UK  1919 
USA  1896  UK  1932 
 
Note: These episodes list only the first year of successive-year reversals and exclude 
wartime reversals, using the REV1 definition. 
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Table A3.  Incidence of Reversals: Bretton Woods and Post-Bretton Woods Periods 
 
Country  Year  Country  Year 
Australia  1946  Algeria  1978 
Australia  1962  Algeria  1989 
Australia  1970  Argentina  1976 
Belgium  1950  Argentina  1982 
Denmark  1948  Austria  1981 
Denmark  1954  Barbados  1973 
Finland  1949  Barbados  1982 
Finland  1951  Barbados  1991 
France  1948  Belgium  1983 
France  1959  Belgium  1992 
Germany  1952  Belize  1984 
Germany  1967  Belize  1995 
Italy  1950  Brazil  1977 
Italy  1964  Brazil  1981 
Japan  1954  Canada  1982 
Netherlands  1949  Canada  1994 
Netherlands  1958  Chile  1974 
Netherlands  1967  Chile  1982 
Norway  1950  Colombia  1973 
Norway  1964  Colombia  1975 
Portugal  1950  Colombia  1984 
Sweden  1949  Costa Rica  1982 
Switzerland  1949  Costa Rica  1990 
Switzerland  1953  Costa Rica  1994 
Switzerland  1965  Denmark  1991 
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Table A3.  Incidence of Reversals: Bretton Woods and Post-Bretton Woods Periods, 
Continued 
 
Country  Year  Country  Year 
Egypt   1987  New Zealand  1976 
Egypt   1989  New Zealand   1986 
Fiji   1973  Norway   1972 
Fiji   1982  Norway   1977 
Finland   1976  Norway   1989 
Finland   1983  Norway   1996 
Finland   1991  Oman   1978 
Gabon   1973  Oman   1987 
Gabon   1978  Panama   1976 
Gabon   1988  Panama   1981 
Gabon   1993  Portugal   1983 
Germany   1985  Portugal   1993 
Greece   1986  Romania   1993 
Grenada   1983  Singapore   1973 
Grenada   1990  Singapore   1975 
Grenada   1994  Singapore   1982 
Hungary   1988  Singapore   1992 
Iceland   1983  Singapore   1994 
Iceland   1992  South Africa   1977 
Ireland   1975  South Africa   1983 
Ireland   1982  Spain   1977 
Ireland   1991  Spain   1984 
Israel   1976  Sweden   1982 
Israel   1984  Sweden   1992 
Italy   1976  Switzerland   1973 
Italy   1992  Switzerland   1991 
Jamaica   1977  Seychelles  1973 
Jamaica   1984  Seychelles  1983 
Jamaica   1992  Seychelles  1988 
Japan   1976  Seychelles  1994 
Japan   1982  Thailand   1978 
Jordan   1984  Thailand   1986 
Jordan   1992  Trinidad & Tobago  1973 
Korea   1982  Trinidad & Tobago  1985 
Malaysia   1975  Trinidad & Tobago  1987 
Malaysia   1984  Trinidad & Tobago  1994 
Malta   1973  United Kingdom   1976 
Malta   1986  United Kingdom   1980 
Mauritius   1981  United Kingdom   1991 
Mauritius   1995  Uruguay   1982 
Mexico   1981  Uruguay   1988 
Mexico   1994  Venezuela   1973 
Mexico   1982  Venezuela   1979   56 
Mexico   1995  Venezuela   1988 
Netherlands   1980  Venezuela   1994 
Netherlands   1989       
 
 
Note: These episodes list only the first year of successive-year reversals and exclude 
wartime reversals, using the REV1 definition. 
 
Source: see text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 